The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released a staggering 71 intelligence reports from the months and years leading up to the September 11th terrorist attacks, offering a deeply revealing and expansive look at the agency’s assessment of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. This trove of documents, compiled from a period of approximately 25 years, provides a significantly expanded understanding of the intelligence community’s prior knowledge of these groups and their potential for future attacks. The release, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the attacks, marks a significant step in uncovering a previously obscured network of intelligence warnings.
The reports, originating from the President’s Daily Brief and subsequent briefings to President Clinton and George W. Bush, detail a comprehensive analysis of al-Qaeda’s plans and ambitions. The CIA Director, John Ratcliffe, stated that the release represented “the single largest release of CIA analysis related to 9/11 ever.” Ratcliffe emphasized that two presidents – Clinton and Bush – had received intelligence warnings about the group’s intent to strike the United States before the attacks. The documents span from February 1998 to the day after, with a notable exception from October 1999, which contained a specific memo detailing a potential aircraft-based attack within the U.S.
The intelligence assessments within the reports are divided into several categories. The earliest document, dated February 13, 1998, warned that bin Laden and other Islamic extremists “met [redacted] and agreed to procure unspecified chemical, biological, and nuclear substances from open markets.” The report stated that bin Laden and his fighters were based in Afghanistan, under the protection of the Taliban, and that the Taliban’s motivations in harboring bin Laden were detailed. A key section highlighted the Taliban’s investment in 57 narcotics laboratories associated with Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban, and the recruitment of experts to develop more addictive drugs, potentially ecstasy or methamphetamine.
Subsequently, reports from February 1998 detailed the Taliban’s motivations in harboring bin Laden, detailing bin Laden’s growing role in Afghanistan’s drug trade. The report noted that in October 1999, the Taliban reported that bin Laden had “made a substantial investment in 57 narcotics laboratories associated with Mullah Omar, and had recruited experts to develop more addictive drugs — possibly ecstasy or methamphetamine,” (The 9/11 Commission later found ‘no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking’). The 9/11 Commission’s final report, in particular, referenced this memo, and determined that the Counterterrorist Center did not subsequently analyze how an aircraft, hijacked or explosives-laden, might be used as a weapon. The report noted that the August 2001 memo indicated that FBI information “indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” The memo also described bin Laden’s preferred option being to strike the US on its own soil in Washington.
The report included a memo titled “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US” from August 2001, which was declassified in 2004 at the request of the 9/11 Commission. The memo said that FBI information “indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” The August memo "was the 36th PDB item briefed so far that year that related to Bin Ladin or al Qaeda, and the first devoted to the possibility of an attack in the United States." The report includes 18 items dated from the Bush administration before the attacks, meaning at least some of the PDB material from the lead-up remains secret.
The 9/11 Commission’s final report determined that “[m]ost of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it.” The final document included the infamous memo titled “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US” from August 2001, which was declassified in 2004 at the request of the 9/11 Commission. The memo said that FBI information “indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” The 9/11 Commission reported that the August memo "was the 36th PDB item briefed so far that year that related to Bin Ladin or al Qaeda, and the first devoted to the possibility of an attack in the United States."
The report also said that bin Laden and the Taliban’s Omar "clashed over Bin Ladin’s determination to mount terrorist attacks" in August 2001.
The 9/11 Commission found that “[m]ost of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something terrible was planned, and they were desperate to stop it.” The report concluded that “the most important failure was one of imagination.” The final document included 18 items dated from the Bush administration before the attacks, meaning at least some of the PDB material from the lead-up remains secret.
The 9/11 Commission determined that “[m]most of the intelligence failure was one of imagination,” and that the agency was unable to anticipate the attacks before they happened. The final document includes 18 items dated from the Bush administration before the attacks, meaning at least some of the PDB material from the lead-up remains secret.
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Source: CBS News
