The African Union (AU) delegation has commenced a two-day field visit to Sudan, a critical juncture following a protracted conflict that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced millions. The mission, spearheaded by the Peace and Security Council (PSC), is focused on establishing a ceasefire, enhancing humanitarian access, and facilitating a political transition to end the war that has fundamentally reshaped Sudan’s landscape. The conflict, which began in April 2023, has ignited a cycle of violence between the SAF and RSF, leading to widespread instability across the country. The PSC has explicitly prioritized establishing a sustainable peace and stability, necessitating a renewed focus on diplomacy and a potential political settlement.
The delegation’s arrival coincides with a period of heightened military activity, with the SAF regaining control of Khartoum, while the RSF remains entrenched in Darfur, and Kordofan continues to be a focal point for fighting. The PSC’s primary objectives are to encourage the SAF and RSF to halt hostilities, improve humanitarian aid delivery, and secure a framework for a future political process that can determine Sudan’s trajectory beyond these two armed groups. The PSC’s priorities are inextricably linked: achieving a ceasefire between the SAF and RSF, improving humanitarian access, and preserving a political process that can define Sudan’s future, particularly in the context of the existing power dynamics.
The AU has repeatedly emphasized the importance of a Sudanese-led political transition, arguing that solely relying on military solutions would not resolve the underlying crisis that preceded the war. Sudan’s transition following the 2019 overthrow of Omar al-Bashir resulted in a deepening of civilian-military tensions, culminating in the military dissolution of the power-sharing arrangement in October 2021, which escalated into the current conflict in April 2023, following months of rivalry between the SAF and RSF over the proposed transition to civilian rule. The conflict’s immediate trigger was the recapture of Kordofan, a strategically vital region linking central, western, and southern Sudan, which now serves as a key battleground.
The AU faces a two-pronged challenge: reducing the intensity of fighting to allow for humanitarian assistance and negotiations, while simultaneously preventing a settlement that merely serves to reinforce existing power structures and territorial claims. The SAF’s recapture of Khartoum has strengthened the army’s control over central Sudan, yet the RSF’s setbacks in Khartoum have not resulted in a decisive military victory. The RSF’s continued presence in Darfur, coupled with their ability to operate across Sudan’s border, remains a significant concern. The battlefield reality is central to the diplomatic challenge; if either side believed they were close to victory, it would have little incentive to compromise. However, neither side has achieved a decisive defeat, creating a stalemate.
The AU has been actively involved in Sudan diplomacy since the war’s commencement, with the PSC adopting a roadmap in May 2023 calling for a permanent and inclusive ceasefire, humanitarian access, civilian protection, and a return to a credible political transition. The SAF and RSF signed commitments in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to establish civilian protection, a short-term ceasefire, and humanitarian arrangements. But these agreements failed to halt the fighting, demonstrating the difficulty of translating political legitimacy into tangible progress.
The PSC has conducted another field mission to Cairo and Port Sudan in October 2024 to press for a ceasefire, humanitarian access, and a return to a political process. The problem has not been a lack of diplomatic initiative; rather, the AU’s challenge is to convince the warring parties to accept that a political process offers something that continued conflict cannot.
The visit’s significance will depend on whether the AU secures commitments that survive after the delegation leaves and creates enough space for negotiations to move forward. Kabir Amadu, a security analyst, contends that the AU lacks the leverage to compel the two sides to stop fighting. He argued that the AU lacks ‘an enforcement mechanism, financial leverage, and a standby military force’ to pressure the main warring parties. This leaves the AU dependent on diplomatic pressure and coordination with regional and international actors. The AU is constrained by the fact that the Sudan war has produced exhaustion rather than a resolution, with both sides receiving substantial internal and external support to continue fighting, but not enough to secure a decisive victory. The two-day visit will not resolve these problems; its significance will hinge on whether the AU can secure commitments that survive after the delegation leaves and create enough space for negotiations to move forward. Dennis Amachree, a former deputy director of Nigeria’s Department of State Services (DSS), suggested that the AU delegation’s challenge is to convert this battlefield stalemate into diplomatic momentum before it hardens into a permanent partition of Sudan, and that the two-day visit will not resolve these problems. The AU needs to secure commitments that will withstand the pressures of the conflict and create a conducive environment for negotiations to proceed.
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Source: Al Jazeera Africa
