The Houthi advance down Yemen’s Red Sea coast this week represents a significant escalation in the conflict, moving beyond simply threatening vital shipping routes – a development that has profound implications for regional and global stability. While the initial narrative has focused on a military victory, analysts now view this as a calculated strategic maneuver, consolidating Houthi control over a critical artery of the nation’s economy and intensifying the conflict’s complexity.
The Houthi’s initial success in controlling the northern Red Sea coastline, including the port city of Hodeidah, has allowed them to initially target Israel and the United States, and subsequently, Saudi-linked vessels, for years. This control has been instrumental in damaging the global economy, as long before the US war with Iran and the shift in the Strait of Hormuz into a tool to restrict international trade, Houthi attacks around Yemen had turned Bab al-Mandeb into a similar weapon, leading to bombing campaigns against the Houthis by the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel.
This advance, however, isn’t merely about securing control over the Red Sea; it’s fundamentally reshaping the geopolitical landscape. The Houthi’s access to the narrow entry points of the Red Sea’s waterways, coupled with the ability to utilize shorter-range weaponry and deploy sea mines, significantly increases their operational capacity. They are now capable of disrupting shipping operations, even with the existing constraints, and establishing a greater potential for both attack and boarding of vessels, which further complicates international trade routes.
The increased ability to target shipping is triggering a noticeable shift in market sentiment. Oil prices have risen as traders price in the ability for Iran and its allies to disrupt shipping in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, two maritime chokepoints of the southern Arabian Peninsula. This disruption has a cascading effect on the global economy, impacting trade flows and security.
However, the consequences extend beyond simply disrupting shipping; the Houthi problem on the Red Sea is escalating. For months, after Saudi Arabia backed a Yemeni government campaign against southern Yemeni separatist forces earlier this year, the mood in the country’s anti-Houthi camp has shifted. The perception was that the Yemeni government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council, had finally gotten its act together. President Rashad al-Alimi repeatedly spoke of a unified military chain of command, allowing the military to overcome the divisions blamed for its inability to defeat the Houthis. The Red Sea coastline was a possible location: the largely flat geography suited the government, allowing Saudi Arabia to effectively use its air power; much of the population is not made up of the Houthis’ traditional support base; and prior Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping meant that there would likely be international buy-in for such a campaign.
The seizure of the Red Sea coastline has broken all of those narratives. The momentum the Yemeni government thought it had, even at the start of this week when it claimed advances in al-Jawf, to the east of the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa, is now gone. After months of projecting unity, Yemen’s anti-Houthi camp is once again turning on itself, trading accusations of blame for the defeat. The message the Houthis have for Saudi Arabia is clear: ‘Your partners in Yemen can’t defeat us.’ Therefore, the potential Houthi argument is that Saudi Arabia has to make a deal with them and agree to their terms, including Riyadh funding public sector salaries, access to income from Yemen’s oil and gas reserves, and no restrictions on flights and shipping to Houthi-controlled ports.
The Houthis are demonstrating a willingness to escalate, promising further action if Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reorganize. Their attacks on Saudi Arabia have been damaging, and the group is promising more if Riyadh increases its military support for the Yemeni government. The risk of any such intervention is clearly there for Saudi Arabia. But so is the risk of inaction. The Houthis have repeatedly demanded more concessions when they were in positions of strength. With the Yemen war unresolved, the Houthis may decide to escalate again in the future, even if a deal is agreed now. And so, policymakers in Riyadh could determine that it makes more sense to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem head-on now, rather than allow it to fester into the future.
Source: Al Jazeera
